“ Even had the whites had historic roots in Africa, the Bantustans would still have been Bantustans.” And of course the Afrikaaners did have a centuries-long presence in South Africa.
In fact, unlike the Zionist yishuv, (the forebears of the) Afrikaaners in the 17th century did actually settle principally in sparsely inhabited areas and had cordial relations with the non-bantu indigenous population.
Is it not a major development that the sheikhs are able to call for an extension of the Abraham Accords, and to reject 'pay-for-slay', without fearing for their lives? If they can do this, and Mahmoud Abbas cannot, does that not in itself indicate that they have greater legitimacy among their people?
The PA already reformed 'pay-for-slay' a few months ago, so I'm not sure how significant that is. I also don't know whether people in the WB need to fear for their lives because of comments on the Abraham Accords. Most importantly, though, the Abraham Accords are with sovereign entities, so whatever the rhetoric the 'emirates' plan can't be understood in that context.
Perhaps I'm asking the wrong questions. I don't know much about this, but it seems to me that the sheikhs' call to focus on working together with Israel on practical matters (such as water supply) is something new in the Palestinian discourse and that this has taken some bravery on their part. Is that a fair assessment?
I’m not sure it’s that new - as I mentioned in the piece, it has echoes of the Village League initiative that was tried in the 1980s. And if it’s brave of them, it may be an indication that there is opposition to the idea among ordinary Palestinians.
I'm not with you on this one. There is no question that the reaction against the declaration was swift rejection. There is also a creeping understanding that the idea of One Palestine has taken a hit, possibly a fatal blow. It is important to remember that the idea of Palestine is, at its core, an imperial one created by the Pashas, then the British, to suit their bureaucratic needs. It did not spring from the earth, does not have a shared narrative save the Nakba. As such, it seems worth while to listen to these streams of thought and project outwards what they could mean, either they be Emirates or Sanjaks or States in federation.
I didn't say I'm opposed to different ideas. What's important is the question of rights: Does the proposed plan mean that Israelis will still control the lives of Palestinians and repress them? If it does - as in the case of the emirates plan - then it's a non-starter. If one proposes a West Bank federation where Palestinians are citizens of Israel or Jordan, that's a different matter.
I think you need to define 'control the lives of Palestinians and repress them.' Meaning, if they were, as David Friedman proposes, given the same rights as Puerto Ricans or residents of Guam, would that be sufficient to you? I personally believe in a Federal or Confederal model, but that too would require demilitarization. Is that 'control' in your book?
Well Puerto Ricans are permanent residents so they can do everything other than vote in national elections, i.e. they can freely live or work anywhere in America. That's definitely not what Kedar is proposing here. In broad terms my position is that the Palestinians should have the same rights we take for granted and we should not be controlling their lives. I think demilitarization is fine though. So the question is - in your federal/confederal model, what rights will the Palestinians have?
You contradict yourself. No-one in Jordan has rights in the sense you mean (they have more rights than in many countries, but certainly Jordan would not be able to e.g. join the EU). The whole question of rights is a distraction from the real issue which is regularizing their status and incorporating them into a political order that can manage them.
I'd partially agree - the issue is that currently they are essentially ruled by Israelis while having substantially less rights than Israelis. You're right that if they were part of Jordan their status would be incorporated into that political order and they would then have the same rights as other Jordanians (as you say, this would mean less rights than Israelis, but we wouldn't be ruling their lives, which is the main concern).
The killing and violence are inevitable if we insist on controlling the lives of Palestinians. This isn't to say that it will diminish if we take that step. But it certainly won't if we don't.
Sure, but we should be rigorous on focussing on the real issue. Palestinians are not going to have rights and the reason for the conflict is not that they don't have rights. They need to be ruled by people that speak their language and they aren't in a century-long blood feud with for reasons that border on self-evident, but this has nothing to do with rights. The emphasis on rights is responsible for numerous mis-steps, such as the 2004 PA elections.
I do not share your liberal values, but even if I did, it should be clear that the short and medium term priority for Arab societies is to promote secure, non-kleptocratic government, build state institutions, and ruthlessly repress belligerent elements. Rights are, at most, an eventual outcome of this process.
All the centralized Arab states mentioned are held together by strong authoritarian governments. Syria and Libya were also in that category just 15 years ago. The existence of strong centralized Arab states proves nothing as they could fall apart just as easily.
A failed entity in the West Bank divided among rival clans who will clamp down on anti-Israel activities in exchange for profits seems like the best approach offered so far.
So are the two state solution and the unitary state.
A collapse in order after the Mayor of Ramallah passes is the likely route to clan division and rule. The PA is not a more effective centralized state than Syria or Libya were 15 years ago.
I addressed this point in the article. I'm happy to discuss this with you, but there needs to be at least some indication that you've read the things I've written and are responding to those, rather than things you would have said anyway.
You wrote "so are the two state solution and the unitary state." I wrote: "None of this means that the two-state solution is necessarily more viable. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict may indeed lack an immediate solution."
Much more insightful would be to note the emergence of clans in Gaza, especially the al-Shahaba clan in Rafah, openly killing Hamas operatives, looting Hamas warehouses and denying Hamas' authority to rule.
They may or may not emerge victorious but these shrewd Bedouin leaders, with more skin in the game than anyone, thought this was a propitious time to take their lives in their hands and challenge Hamas.
Would it be even more so for the Hebron sheiks, who face a much weaker PA in an area where Israeli security forces can put down any credible threat?
I hope this clarifies for you the difference between a fantasy and a practical possibility with real chances, but no guarantee of course, of success.
Is Egypt "more functioning" than Gaza in 2025? Sure, I guess, if you squint, but my cheap point still stands.
It's easy to take a shit on innovative ideas that try to escape the hell that this conflict visits upon the millions of people who have to live in it. I don't really see what you're offering as an alternative.
Hi - when you refer to the "millions of people who have to live in it," are you referring to Israelis? Because I am one; I moved here 19 years ago this very day. So the intimation that I'm being needlessly cynical from the outside is misplaced. But if you're interested in innovative ideas you might like to read about the 'A Land for All' initiative: https://www.2s1h.org/en
Cool. I was referring to the millions of people who live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea regardless of what they call themselves. I'm also one of those people.
I don't know why you got the impression that I thought you were being cynical. Actually, I think you are being naive. I think you are deeply misguided about the intentions and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Arabs with which you and I unfortunately share a home. Happy to continue privately if you're interested.
What do you think my view is of the intentions and aspirations of the majority of the Arabs? Because this article wasn't about the intentions and aspirations of the majority of the Arabs.
“ Even had the whites had historic roots in Africa, the Bantustans would still have been Bantustans.” And of course the Afrikaaners did have a centuries-long presence in South Africa.
In fact, unlike the Zionist yishuv, (the forebears of the) Afrikaaners in the 17th century did actually settle principally in sparsely inhabited areas and had cordial relations with the non-bantu indigenous population.
Is it not a major development that the sheikhs are able to call for an extension of the Abraham Accords, and to reject 'pay-for-slay', without fearing for their lives? If they can do this, and Mahmoud Abbas cannot, does that not in itself indicate that they have greater legitimacy among their people?
The PA already reformed 'pay-for-slay' a few months ago, so I'm not sure how significant that is. I also don't know whether people in the WB need to fear for their lives because of comments on the Abraham Accords. Most importantly, though, the Abraham Accords are with sovereign entities, so whatever the rhetoric the 'emirates' plan can't be understood in that context.
Perhaps I'm asking the wrong questions. I don't know much about this, but it seems to me that the sheikhs' call to focus on working together with Israel on practical matters (such as water supply) is something new in the Palestinian discourse and that this has taken some bravery on their part. Is that a fair assessment?
I’m not sure it’s that new - as I mentioned in the piece, it has echoes of the Village League initiative that was tried in the 1980s. And if it’s brave of them, it may be an indication that there is opposition to the idea among ordinary Palestinians.
I'm not with you on this one. There is no question that the reaction against the declaration was swift rejection. There is also a creeping understanding that the idea of One Palestine has taken a hit, possibly a fatal blow. It is important to remember that the idea of Palestine is, at its core, an imperial one created by the Pashas, then the British, to suit their bureaucratic needs. It did not spring from the earth, does not have a shared narrative save the Nakba. As such, it seems worth while to listen to these streams of thought and project outwards what they could mean, either they be Emirates or Sanjaks or States in federation.
I didn't say I'm opposed to different ideas. What's important is the question of rights: Does the proposed plan mean that Israelis will still control the lives of Palestinians and repress them? If it does - as in the case of the emirates plan - then it's a non-starter. If one proposes a West Bank federation where Palestinians are citizens of Israel or Jordan, that's a different matter.
I think you need to define 'control the lives of Palestinians and repress them.' Meaning, if they were, as David Friedman proposes, given the same rights as Puerto Ricans or residents of Guam, would that be sufficient to you? I personally believe in a Federal or Confederal model, but that too would require demilitarization. Is that 'control' in your book?
Well Puerto Ricans are permanent residents so they can do everything other than vote in national elections, i.e. they can freely live or work anywhere in America. That's definitely not what Kedar is proposing here. In broad terms my position is that the Palestinians should have the same rights we take for granted and we should not be controlling their lives. I think demilitarization is fine though. So the question is - in your federal/confederal model, what rights will the Palestinians have?
You contradict yourself. No-one in Jordan has rights in the sense you mean (they have more rights than in many countries, but certainly Jordan would not be able to e.g. join the EU). The whole question of rights is a distraction from the real issue which is regularizing their status and incorporating them into a political order that can manage them.
I'd partially agree - the issue is that currently they are essentially ruled by Israelis while having substantially less rights than Israelis. You're right that if they were part of Jordan their status would be incorporated into that political order and they would then have the same rights as other Jordanians (as you say, this would mean less rights than Israelis, but we wouldn't be ruling their lives, which is the main concern).
I think the main concern is all the killing and violence.
The killing and violence are inevitable if we insist on controlling the lives of Palestinians. This isn't to say that it will diminish if we take that step. But it certainly won't if we don't.
Sure, but we should be rigorous on focussing on the real issue. Palestinians are not going to have rights and the reason for the conflict is not that they don't have rights. They need to be ruled by people that speak their language and they aren't in a century-long blood feud with for reasons that border on self-evident, but this has nothing to do with rights. The emphasis on rights is responsible for numerous mis-steps, such as the 2004 PA elections.
I do not share your liberal values, but even if I did, it should be clear that the short and medium term priority for Arab societies is to promote secure, non-kleptocratic government, build state institutions, and ruthlessly repress belligerent elements. Rights are, at most, an eventual outcome of this process.
All the centralized Arab states mentioned are held together by strong authoritarian governments. Syria and Libya were also in that category just 15 years ago. The existence of strong centralized Arab states proves nothing as they could fall apart just as easily.
A failed entity in the West Bank divided among rival clans who will clamp down on anti-Israel activities in exchange for profits seems like the best approach offered so far.
It's not the best approach because it's a fantasy that's never going to happen.
So are the two state solution and the unitary state.
A collapse in order after the Mayor of Ramallah passes is the likely route to clan division and rule. The PA is not a more effective centralized state than Syria or Libya were 15 years ago.
I addressed this point in the article. I'm happy to discuss this with you, but there needs to be at least some indication that you've read the things I've written and are responding to those, rather than things you would have said anyway.
No you didn't: no mention of possible or likely changes to the PA post-Abbas and there is no stronger Palestinian organization in the West Bank.
I read the article but wasn't much there.
You wrote "so are the two state solution and the unitary state." I wrote: "None of this means that the two-state solution is necessarily more viable. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict may indeed lack an immediate solution."
Superficial at best.
The gist of the article is the Hebron sheiks.
Much more insightful would be to note the emergence of clans in Gaza, especially the al-Shahaba clan in Rafah, openly killing Hamas operatives, looting Hamas warehouses and denying Hamas' authority to rule.
They may or may not emerge victorious but these shrewd Bedouin leaders, with more skin in the game than anyone, thought this was a propitious time to take their lives in their hands and challenge Hamas.
Would it be even more so for the Hebron sheiks, who face a much weaker PA in an area where Israeli security forces can put down any credible threat?
I hope this clarifies for you the difference between a fantasy and a practical possibility with real chances, but no guarantee of course, of success.
> functioning Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco
Your threshold for functioning is remarkably low
I used the word "more" functioning, which you must have read but chose to ignore in order to make a cheap point.
Is Egypt "more functioning" than Gaza in 2025? Sure, I guess, if you squint, but my cheap point still stands.
It's easy to take a shit on innovative ideas that try to escape the hell that this conflict visits upon the millions of people who have to live in it. I don't really see what you're offering as an alternative.
Hi - when you refer to the "millions of people who have to live in it," are you referring to Israelis? Because I am one; I moved here 19 years ago this very day. So the intimation that I'm being needlessly cynical from the outside is misplaced. But if you're interested in innovative ideas you might like to read about the 'A Land for All' initiative: https://www.2s1h.org/en
Cool. I was referring to the millions of people who live between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea regardless of what they call themselves. I'm also one of those people.
I don't know why you got the impression that I thought you were being cynical. Actually, I think you are being naive. I think you are deeply misguided about the intentions and aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Arabs with which you and I unfortunately share a home. Happy to continue privately if you're interested.
What do you think my view is of the intentions and aspirations of the majority of the Arabs? Because this article wasn't about the intentions and aspirations of the majority of the Arabs.