The View from the Throne Villages
When the clans ruled Palestine and what this teaches us about today
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ottoman rule weakened because of the failed siege of Vienna (1683), and the Treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Kucuk Qaynarca (1774). This resulted in decentralization throughout the empire, with local sheikhs and chieftains becoming responsible for tax collection and protection. Examples of this phenomenon include the Deys in Algeria, the Beys in Tunisia, the Mahdiya in Sudan, the Wahabis in Arabia, and the Ma’nis and the Shihabis in Lebanon.
Palestine was no exception, with Dhahir al Omar, Ahmad Pasha al Jazzar, and the Madis in the north; the Nimrs, Toukans, Jarrars, Abdul Hadis, Barghoutis, Samhans, Rayyans, Jayyusis, and Abu Hijles in the center; and the Amrs, Azzas, and Wahaids in the south. In the central highlands (today’s West Bank and foothills), there were more than 40 “throne villages” (qura al-karasi) – rural local seats in the form of semi-urbanized residential and administrative compounds built of distinctive stone structures.
Their story is told in ‘Throne Villages of the Highlands: Local Nobility and Their Mansions in Ottoman Palestine’ by the late Palestinian geographer Kamal Abdulfattah in Near Eastern Archaeology. Most of the throne villages were located in mountainous areas and were semi-independent. They were divided into neighborhoods that housed the sheikhs’ extended families, with the ruler residing in the family mansion or palace, which served as both living quarters and administrative headquarters. “The architecture of these mansions is a hybrid between urban and peasant design, reflecting not only the origin of the owners but also their socio-political aspirations,” Abdulfattah writes.
In Kur, near Tulkarm, seat of the Bani Sa’ab Sheikhdom, the throne village was built on a ridge, with a steep slope to the east, while water was supplied by cisterns. “Its uphill location and the massive architectural building style enhanced the perception that the village was strong, secure, and defensible,” Abdulfattah explains. “The sense of strength and height was intended to impress the residents of the surrounding area under the chieftain’s judicial purvue.” The palace was known as Dar Abdullah, the Palace of the Ruler, and the Tower of the Castle, each name relating to its function – residential, governmental, and defensive. Inspired by earlier Mamluk architectural styles, they featured pointed arches, textured stone, inscriptions, and guard seats with decorated doors. The buildings projected strength, stability, and authority, while also offering privacy. From these palaces, sheikhs could mobilize peasants in the event of war while also facilitating or restricting access to trade.
Ibrahim Pasha’s invasion of Palestine in the 1830s ended the power of the sheikhs. He systematically broke down the decentralized feudal system, instead introducing a centralized bureaucratic system. He also disarmed local militias and removed traditional chiefs from positional powers. Finally, he undermined the sheikhs economically by redistributing land, introducing new taxation systems, and centralizing economic control. He also broke the traditional tribal and clan-based power structures. Most significantly, he directed appointed government officials, eliminating the intermediary role of local sheikhs. Those who resisted were executed, imprisoned, or exiled to Egypt. His repression was especially harsh in areas like Nablus and Hebron, where the sheikhs had been most powerful.
His invasion modernized Palestine’s governance structure, replacing a fragmented system of local power with a centralized, bureaucratic administration. He divided Palestine into administrative districts (sanjaks) headed by Egyptian-appointed governors. Local councils (majlis) were selected based on loyalty rather than tribal affiliation, while civil courts undermined the traditional justice systems administered by tribal leaders. The conscription system deliberately mixed men from different tribal backgrounds to break down traditional loyalties; according to records, some villages lost up to 40% of their male population to conscription, crippling their ability to maintain armed resistance. The economic reforms he made, meanwhile, would later help make it easier for the Zionist movement to purchase land.
As the local chiefdoms collapsed, some rural families left for the city; others remained. The power vacuum was later filled by urban notable families (like the Husaynis, Khalidis, and Nashishibis), while formal centers of tribal authority like Nablus, Hebron, and rural Gaza lost influence permanently. Today, the throne villages are a shadow of their former selves. In their new book Forgotten: Searching for Palestine’s Hidden Places and Lost Memorials (you can read my recent review of the book for Fathom here), Raja Shehadeh and Penny Johnson visit Al Samhan Palace in the village of Ras Karkar, close to Ramallah. Completed in 1799, it had taken 14 years to build but was now run down. Reflecting on their visit, they write:
This time, as we left the Ramallah enclave, the sad thought crossed our mind that our city – the seat of the Palestinian Authority and of our self-declared statehood – was simply another version of a throne village, exercising an ever-weakening degree of autonomy and subject to a much more imposing central authority: the Israeli occupation. Our Palestinian president, to be sure, has been in power without elections long enough to qualify as a feudal sheikh.
An increasing number of thinkers on the Israeli right seek the restoration of clan-based rule. As I wrote earlier in the war, for example, Mordechai Kedar thinks that Gaza should be split into up to six ‘emirates’ to be ruled by tribes or clans, with Israel controlling the lands between. He also thinks this would be the best solution in the West Bank, arguing that, just like in the Gulf, only the clans have true legitimacy. The idea is reminiscent of the attempt in the late 1970s to create ‘Village Leagues,’ local leadership that aimed to supplant the role of the PLO. This was a complete failure. The reference to the Gulf Emirates also ignores the most pertinent point – that the Gulf states are sovereign entities whereas his Gazan imitations would be mere Bantustans.
The irony is profound. While Ibrahim Pasha’s invasion dismantled the local chiefdom system, today tribal structures are continually raised as potential solutions to continued impasses. But the organic social fabrics that once sustained these clan structures have undergone deep changes, making attempts to revive them unlikely to succeed, particularly given the rise of Palestinian nationalism. Meanwhile, the ghost of the throne villages haunts institutions like the Palestinian Authority, a reminder of its crippling lack of sovereignty. Today, these once-proud palaces stand as mute witnesses of a history that is unlikely to revive.
Beautiful and fascinating, as always. You're got really great stuff!
This is a fascinating article, Alex, and I think it also helps explain why the Palestinian Authority has struggled. Not just because of Israel, but because of the way it came to be.
Arafat didn’t descend from throne village nobility, but the system he built reproduced their internal logic. Fatah, especially under his leadership, operated through networks of loyalty, patronage, and familial influence that closely resembled the qura al-karasi. His alliance with old Jerusalemite families like the Husaynis wasn’t incidental. It anchored Fatah in a lineage of informal, clan-based power.
After Oslo, the PA didn’t grow into a modern bureaucratic state. It ossified into something else, a halfway regime where ministries became fiefdoms, security services were split along factional lines, and proximity to Ramallah’s inner circle replaced institutional competence (funnily enough, the scriptwriters of Fauda did a better job showing this reality, than we could ever do). This is less a sovereign government in waiting than a custodian of limited autonomy. Elections don’t happen not because of sheer authoritarian impulse, but because the system itself is designed to reward stagnation. Hamas existing is just a convenient excuse.
Israel's role matters, of course. But the deeper pathology lies in how the PA mirrors the very structures it was supposed to transcend. It rules parts of the West Bank like a subcontractor, not a state. And in that sense, Ramallah has become its own kind of throne village. One with better internet, as someone once said.