Gaza’s Clans Ain’t Nuthing ta F’ Wit

The plan to divide Gaza into 'Emirates' is a non-starter.

I’m excited to announce that I’ll now be publishing two articles a week here on Love of the Land. Shorter opinion pieces will be published on Monday or Tuesday, while the regular deeper historical dives will come out on Thursday or Friday. Paid subscribers will now get exclusive opinion piece and one longer piece each month, as well as the monthly recommendations email.

Last week, the leader of the Doghmush clan in Gaza City, along with 10 other relatives, was allegedly executed by Hamas for stealing humanitarian aid and being in contact with Israel. Like many other important aspects of the war in Gaza, this story has received little coverage in the Western media. Subsequently, a Hamas-linked website also warned Palestinians against cooperating with Israel in providing security for aid convoys in Gaza. Following the execution, the Doghmush clan issued a statement declaring that all Hamas members are legitimate targets and pledged retribution against all responsible.

This episode comes against the background of ongoing problems in supplying aid to northern Gaza, and America’s decision to build a temporary port off the coast. It’s easily forgotten, but Israel had completed most of its ground offensive in north Gaza around the end of the year, turning its attention southwards towards Khan Younis. Crucially, though, there was no “day after” plan to fill the vacuum that inevitably emerged, allowing it to be refilled – at least in part - by the surviving Hamas forces.

There has been justifiable and widespread incredulity at the lack of a credible Israeli “day after” plan. As American diplomat Richard Haas quipped, “it’s like Clausewitz hasn’t been translated into Hebrew.” The Prussian military theorist wrote: “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” In other words, no matter how just the war is, if you don’t have a plan of how to end it, you may end up losing it.

In February, after months of pleading from Israel’s allies, Netanyahu presented a vague summary of his government’s post-war vision. It proposed Israeli security control over the land west of Jordan, a rejection of unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state, and the replacement of Hamas administrative control with local representatives “who are not affiliated with terrorist countries or groups and are not financially supported by them,” with the goal of achieving the demilitarization and deradicalization of the Strip. The document also proposes an Israeli presence on the Gaza-Egypt border in southern Gaza, and the closure of UNRWA.

The Palestinian Authority is not mentioned in the document, either in its existing or “revamped” form, thus begging the question: Who are these local representatives supposed to be? Among many on the Israeli right, the answer is: Gaza’s clans. A leading proponent of this position is Dr. Mordechai Kedar, an Israeli scholar of the Arab world. Kedar argues that Gaza should be split into up to six ‘emirates’ to be ruled by tribes or clans, with Israel controlling the lands between. He also believes this would be the best solution in the West Bank, arguing that, just like in the Gulf, only the clans have true legitimacy. The idea is reminiscent of the attempt in the late 1970s to create ‘Village Leagues,’ local leadership that aimed to supplant the role of the PLO. This was a complete failure.

There is little reason to think that attempting something similar in Gaza would be any more successful. Despite his expertise, Kedar suffers from a problem shared by ideologues of all stripes; he can throw out fantastical plans without having the responsibility of implementing them in the real world. His reference to the Gulf Emirates also ignores the most pertinent point – that the Gulf states are sovereign entities whereas his Gaza imitations would be mere Bantustans.

More importantly, those who would be responsible for funding the reconstruction of Gaza, namely the Saudis, the Emiratis, and the Qataris, would not agree to the plan. Based on figures used by the Institute for Defense Analyses, an estimated 42,000 to 84,000 soldiers would be required for Gaza’s post-war security needs. Israel has neither the desire nor the funds to permanently reoccupy Gaza, meaning it must produce a post-war vision that is at least somewhat palatable to the Gulf states and the Saudis. Anyone who ignores these facts is deceiving their audience.

The ongoing failure to provide sufficient aid to northern Gaza is a direct result of the government’s lack of planning for the day after. It is also one of the reasons why countries around the world are losing patience with Israel. Tragically, this was avoidable. Having already divided north and south Gaza at the start of the war, and then having mostly completed operations in northern Gaza, Israel could have begun implementing a credible post-war plan with international support while turning its attention southwards.

The reason for this failure is obvious: The government seeks the permanent subjugation of the Palestinians. It wants denazification, but without the Marshall Plan. October 7 was a reminder that Hamas and many Palestinians are violently opposed to any form of sovereign Jewish presence in the land, and we are entirely justified to do everything we can to uproot this threat, even if it risks our international standing. But for those on the right, permanent subjugation is preferable to policies that might lessen the conflict. For them, the Palestinians are a sort of unchanging, metaphysical entity, which is why when you ask what the Palestinians would have to do to be entitled to greater sovereign rights of their own, they respond vaguely. It is right not to consent to a Palestinian state if the Palestinians plan on using it to continue their war against Jewish sovereignty. But they must be offered specific, attainable, reasonable, and measurable steps that they could take to ameliorate their situation.

This is why a credible post-war vision for Gaza is so important. It provides an opportunity to reverse the mistakes of unilateral disengagement, to take advantage of the goodwill there would be from the Saudis and the Emiratis were Israel to build a regime in which Palestinians would be able to see that murderous rejectionism doesn’t pay. Instead, the right offers an absurd fantasy of clan-ruled Bantustans, which would only produce a Somali-like anarchy. If this fantasy persists, Israel risks a post-war Gaza that is no better than it was on October 6.