No, the attack on Fordow doesn’t make a nuclear Iran inevitable

A popular myth rebutted

Following the overnight bombing of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant by the United States, those who claimed it was not possible to destroy Iran's nuclear program are now claiming that Iran will try to obtain a nuclear weapon as quickly as possible (having apparently not done so before). For example, Trita Parsi, confusing his role as analyst with that of a prophet, wrote: "Trump just guaranteed that Iran will be a nuclear weapons state in the next 5 to 10 years. Particularly if the regime changes [his italics]." Many others are fulminating in the same vein. More broadly, the argument here is that countries around the world will conclude that the best way to defend themselves from attack is to seek nuclear weapons. But there is little actual evidence for this position.

The historical record provides compelling evidence against the assumption that military attacks inevitably drive states toward nuclear weapons development. While some states have accelerated nuclear programs following security threats, for example Pakistan after India’s 1974 nuclear test or North Korea after being designated part of the ‘Axis of Evil’ in 2002, the majority of attacked states have not pursued nuclear weapons. Neither Serbia (1999), Iraq (post-2003), nor Libya (post-2011) initiated or re-initiated a nuclear weapons program in response to military intervention. These cases demonstrate that states often pursue alternative strategies for ensuring their survival and security that do not involve crossing the nuclear threshold.

Many argue that Gaddafi’s fall is the cautionary tale that pushes states like Iran to get the bomb. In 2003, he abandoned Libya's nuclear program after negotiations with the U.S. and UK, largely motivated by the desire to end sanctions and normalize relations. Critics would later cite his overthrow in 2011 as proof that this was a mistake, arguing that nuclear weapons might have deterred NATO intervention. But the Arab Spring toppled regimes across the region, including ones with no WMD history, suggesting Gaddafi’s fate was caused by domestic uprising rather than disarmament. Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak were not threatened by NATO but suffered the same fate. Moreover, disarmament gave Gaddafi eight years of international engagement and economic gains; it did not trigger his fall. Gaddafi fell despite disarmament, not because of it.

Iraq's trajectory further undermines the linear relationship between attack and nuclearization. Despite facing the most comprehensive military intervention of the modern era, followed by years of occupation and ongoing security challenges, Iraq has shown no inclination to restart its nuclear weapons program. This suggests that factors beyond immediate security threats—including state capacity, domestic priorities, and international integration—play crucial roles in nuclear decision-making.

Other countries facing potential military threat have not pursued nuclear weapons because of U.S. military protection, for example South Korea, Japan, and Germany. These cases illustrate that credible alliances, not fear of attack, drive nuclear restraint. For many states, the extended deterrence provided by nuclear-armed allies offers a more cost-effective and politically viable alternative to independent nuclear arsenals.

South Korea's case is particularly relevant to contemporary debates about Iran. Despite facing an existential threat from nuclear-armed North Korea for decades, it has consistently chosen to rely on U.S. security guarantees rather than develop its own nuclear capabilities. Although sometimes challenged, this decision reflects not only confidence in American commitments but also a sophisticated cost-benefit analysis that considers the economic, diplomatic, and security risks associated with nuclear weapons development.

Japan's experience provides another compelling example. As the only nation to suffer nuclear attack, Japan possesses both the technical capability and potential motivation to develop nuclear weapons. Yet it has consistently chosen to remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella while developing advanced civilian nuclear technology. This decision demonstrates that even states with significant security concerns and technical capabilities can find alternative paths to security that do not involve nuclear weapons.

Going for the bomb invites its own risks, creating a dangerous vulnerability window where threatened states might attack. This "window of vulnerability" represents a fundamental challenge for aspiring nuclear powers, as the development process itself can trigger preemptive military action. Iran's own experience over the past two decades (and especially over the past two weeks) illustrates this dynamic, with its nuclear facilities repeatedly targeted and its program subjected to cyber warfare, sabotage, sanctions, and now bombs.

Furthermore, as the case of North Korea shows, going nuclear invites severe sanctions isolation and increased military pressure, not security. The Glenn Amendment, enacted as part of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, is a U.S. law that imposes sanctions on non-nuclear weapons states that detonate a nuclear explosive device or transfer such devices or technology. The sanctions include the termination of most U.S. foreign assistance, restrictions on defense sales and military financing, and opposition to loans from international financial institutions.

These legal frameworks create powerful disincentives for nuclear proliferation. The economic costs alone can be devastating for developing economies that rely on international trade and investment. North Korea is often cited as the outstanding example of a state preventing attack by going nuclear. After all, it got the bomb and hasn’t been attacked since. But this has come at the cost of total economic collapse, global pariah status, and zero influence beyond its borders.

This dissuades some regimes from pursuing the same path despite security concerns, and it defies logic to think, as Parsi does, that a democratic, mullah-free Iran, which would undoubtedly want to be part of the world economy, would choose to pursue this course. A post-Ayatollah Iran would be more likely to prioritize economic development, regional integration, and international legitimacy over the pursuit of nuclear weapons, which would only perpetuate its isolation and economic difficulties.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and global norms against nuclear weapons, supported by IAEA inspections, have successfully dissuaded many other capable countries, for example Brazil or Argentina, from crossing the nuclear threshold, even in tense regions. These institutional frameworks create both legal obligations and normative constraints that make nuclear weapons development politically costly for most states. The success of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco in Latin America, demonstrates that states can find collective security solutions that do not require nuclear weapons. Brazil and Argentina, despite their historical rivalry and advanced nuclear technology, chose to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and submit to international monitoring. This decision reflected not weakness, but an understanding of how nuclear weapons might actually undermine rather than enhance their security and international standing.

Nor is it true that all nuclear aspirants started their programs before military attacks. In cases like Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, decisions were made to start nuclear programs for strategic and long-term reasons, rather than short-term reactions to airstrikes or regime-change threats. The timing and evolution of these programs suggest that nuclear weapons development is driven by complex calculations involving prestige, regional competition, domestic politics, and long-term strategic planning.

Clearly the most important factor is the type of regime and its psychology. North Korea and Pakistan viewed the bomb as a symbol of sovereignty (the latter particularly in light of India's nuclear successes), not just survival, while others do not feel compelled despite vulnerability. Regime type, ideological orientation, and national identity play crucial roles in nuclear decision-making that cannot be reduced to simple security calculations.

Israel has attacked three potential nuclear states: Iraq (1981), Syria (2007), and now Iran. Neither Iraq nor Syria now have nuclear weapons, nor are there any signs that they will do in the future. Military action against nuclear facilities, while controversial, does not inevitably drive states toward nuclear weapons acquisition. Instead, it may disrupt nuclear programs sufficiently to alter the strategic calculations of target states.

The Iraqi case is particularly noteworthy because it involved the destruction of a nearly completed reactor at Osirak. Despite this setback, and Iraq's subsequent conflicts with Iran and the international community, Iraq never successfully restarted its nuclear weapons program. This suggests that the window of opportunity for nuclear weapons development may be narrower than commonly assumed, and that military intervention can effectively close that window under certain circumstances.

Of course, there is no guarantee that Iran won't successfully pursue a nuclear weapons program in the future. But there is nothing inevitable or rational about it doing so. Currently, its ideological regime and regional ambitions are fundamentally different to that of South Korea or Argentina. If Iran wants to survive and flourish, the most sensible option it could take would be to abandon its Islamic imperial war against Israel and seek coexistence. There is no reason for Israel and Iran to be enemies; were it not for the mullahs, it is inconceivable that the events of the previous couple of weeks would have transpired. A post-revolutionary Iran would have every incentive to pursue normalization rather than nuclear escalation.

Were it to pursue coexistence, the dream of turning the Middle East into a nuclear weapons-free region might become less of a fantasy. Currently, Israel is the only state in the region with nuclear weapons, a source of great anguish for many. The problem is that those pushing for a Middle East free of WMDs usually have no objection to the eliminationism of regimes like Iran. Clearly a regional non-proliferation agreement would have to come at the end of a process that would resolve all the outstanding problems of the region (including the Palestinian question).

To be clear, I am (sadly) not a prophet, and I am not certain that Iran will not continue trying to obtain a nuclear weapon. The current regime’s strategic outlook, ideological orientation, and willingness to endure enormous costs for political goals means a continued nuclear pursuit can’t be ruled out. It might also resume its “threshold” strategy, which could provide deterrent benefits while avoiding the full costs of proliferation. But it will certainly find it harder to do so. Even if the program has only been severely delayed, this also serves strategic objectives. Not every intervention has to be perfect: strategic disruption is also beneficial. Either way, it is wrong to claim that Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon is now inevitable, or that it would be wise to pursue this course. Iran’s future is not written in uranium. Whether under the current regime or a future one, the decision to build the bomb will remain a choice, not a fate. That choice is shaped less by the attack on Fordow than by Iran’s vision for its place in the world. An Iran that chooses integration over confrontation and economic development over the ‘Axis of Resistance’ (in the spirit of the Abraham Accords) would find itself in a far stronger strategic position than any nuclear arsenal could provide.