Looking for a Smoking Gun When the Fuse is Already Lit

Why the U.S. intelligence estimate on Iran’s nuclear timeline proves less than critics think—and why Israel couldn’t wait

Critics of Israel’s attack on Iran (on both the left and right) think they have their smoking gun. According to a report in CNN, contrary to Israeli warnings that Iran was reaching the point of no return in its attempt to obtain nuclear weapons, US intelligence assessments suggested that Iran was up to three years away from being able to produce and deliver one to a target of its choosing. This supports their argument that Israel’s war on Iran is the equivalent of the Second Gulf War, one justified by a fictitious threat.

Critics cite a three-year timeline as proof Israel exaggerated the threat. Yet, the very same report cites a U.S. official saying Iran has “all the things they need” for a bomb. Commander of U.S. Central Command, Gen Michael Erik Kurilla adds that Iran could have enough weapons-grade uranium for “up to 10 nuclear weapons in three weeks.”

Estimating Iran’s breakout time is not like timing popcorn – it involves layers of intelligence uncertainty, hidden facilities, and deliberate deception. Even if the three-year breakout time is correct, though, it’s not the smoking gun the critics think it is.

The logic of their position is that it is only justified to go to war against a country that is undeniably an existential threat. I’ve already used a war-as-chess metaphor this week so I may as well double down on the cliches and quote Sun Tzu, whose strategy of exploiting enemy weakness before strength is not abstract but reflects the exact dynamics at play in Operation Rising Lion. “He who is prudent and lies in wait for an enemy who is not, will be victorious,” he writes, advising rulers to shape the battlefield and strike before the enemy becomes capable. Much of what he writes applies perfectly to Rising Lion. “Attack him when he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected,” exactly what the Mossad did by smuggling drones into the country unhindered. “You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places that are undefended” describes Israel’s strategy of only attacking once it had sufficiently weakened Iran’s air defenses, and “You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy” refers to Israel’s supremacy over Iran’s airspace.

Sun Tzu is also backed up by Clausewitz, who writes: “The best strategy is always to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point.” October 7 was the opposite of this principle in action: Hamas chose the timing, the terrain, and the terms of engagement, exploiting Israels complacency. Preemption, in this light, is not just about preventing danger, but about choosing the battlefield, the timing, and the conditions of engagement, which is exactly what Israel has done with Operation Rising Lion. It is a deliberate reversal of the helplessness experienced on October 7. Delaying action until a threat is fully revealed – as those crowing about the three-year assessment seem to be suggesting Israel does with Iran – may mean confronting it when one’s ability to shape outcomes is greatly reduced. Waiting for perfect clarity can be fatal.

The main reason to attack Iran now was the unprecedented window of opportunity opened by its massive miscalculations post-October 7, and the fear that this window might soon close. Those selectively picking intelligence reports for their smoking gun seem to be suggesting that it would have been better to have waited for Iran to be much closer to getting a nuclear bomb, irrespective of the other conditions. The logic of Operation Rising Lion, though, is not one of aggression for its own sake but a sensible analysis of the strategic conditions. If Iran were to gain strength, then the window for action would have narrowed once more.

Israel has engaged in preemptive warfare frequently in the past not because we are a nation of bloodthirsty warmongers, but because survival is our main goal and because waiting until it is too late can often be fatal. The classic example of this is of course the Six-Day War, where we preemptively destroyed Egyptian airfields without abstract legal justification but because of strategic necessity.

Military planners refer to a “window of vulnerability” – a finite period when a threat can be neutralized with relative ease. Once the window closes, the cost of action rises dramatically. And this isn’t the first time we have attacked a country committed to our destruction before it goes nuclear. In 1981 Israel bombed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor before it could even become functional. Though criticized at the time, it is now widely seen – even by former critics – as a necessary intervention that prevented Iraq from obtaining nuclear weapons. As international relations scholar Richard K. Betts wrote in Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning: “Preemption often appears irrational to outsiders, but in the eyes of those who must live with the consequences of inaction, it may be the only rational choice.” This logic echoes loudly in the Israeli consciousness.

The problem is that international law tends to frown upon preemptive wars. The UN Charter permits self-defense only if an armed attack occurs. But this legalistic framework does not always align with strategic necessity. When the cost of inaction is annihilation, legal strictures, while essential, are often ill-equipped to address the dilemmas of a potentially existential threat. Echoing both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, Michael Walzer addresses this problem in Just and Unjust Wars, defending preemptive war if “waiting…greatly magnifies the risk.”

Of course, one can agree with all this and still disagree with Israel’s decision to go to war. The questions about Fordow and the potential cost if the attack doesn’t fully eliminate Iran’s nuclear program remain. For the critics, though, none of these questions are of interest. We are told not to worry about a regime that literally counts down to our destruction in its capital city, while attempting to surround us with its proxies. Would these same critics support action if Iran were three weeks away from a bomb? Their silence suggests not. The real smoking gun isn’t a disputed timeline – it’s Iran’s unwavering intent, and our knowledge that the window to act may never open again.