Bibi's Gambit

Why it’s wrong to claim that there's no strategy behind Operation Rising Lion

In an article published today by Unherd, ‘The West has forgotten the art of strategy,’ Eurointelligence director Wolfgang Munchau argues that:

Israel’s strike against Iran is a classic case of a trade-off where a short-term tactical manoeuvre is bought at the expense of a weaker strategic position in the long run. I am not the first commentator to observe that Israel’s attack against Iran will succeed tactically, possibly with sensational success, but it will not stop Iran’s nuclear weapons programme. Any future Iranian strategic planner will logically conclude from the last series of attacks that Iran absolutely needs the bomb. Other countries in the region might too. Ukraine’s biggest regret is having agreed to give up its Soviet-era nuclear weapons. Had the country kept them, Putin would never have attacked.

This argument has been made widely since the start of the war, and it deserves serious scrutiny. According to military sources, Operation Rising Lion has four main objectives: 1) Damaging Iran’s nuclear program; 2) Damaging Iran’s ballistic missile program; 3) Damaging Iran’s “plan to annihilate Israel” through ground attacks (i.e. its proxies) and 4) Creating the conditions for a long-term prevention of Iran’s nuclear program through diplomatic means. The word “damaging” dominates, not “destroying.” According to Munchau and other observers, anything short of stopping Iran’s nuclear weapons program through military action (which he believes to be impossible) will prove counter-productive in the long run, arguing that it will simply hasten Iran’s march to the bomb.

At the heart of this problem is the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, buried deep into a mountain around 30 kilometers northeast of the Shiite holy city of Qom. As Arieh Kovler writes on his Facebook page:

If Israel has some genius plan to take out the Fordow enrichment facility, then this Iran move is a well-calculated strike that makes sense. If Israel’s only plan for dealing with Fordow is “Maybe Trump will do it for us if we ask nicely enough,” then I don’t know what the hell we’re doing. The next week or so will show us if this war sets back the Iranian nuclear programme or if it’s actually going to supercharge it.

According to this view, supported by Munchau, anything short of destroying Iran’s nuclear program is at best a pyrrhic victory and at worst a strategic failure. But what about the reverse? What if Israel had allowed diplomacy to take its course and what if that diplomacy had also failed to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon? This would also have been a strategic failure, no?

There’s a double standard when comparing diplomatic and military action. Critics always treat diplomacy as preferable, even when it carries the same risks as military force (the most infamous example of this is the Munich Agreement). What critics wrongly describe as a lack of strategy is actually a reality where every course of action carries risk. There are no certain outcomes, regardless of the tactic adopted. Military force naturally appears to be riskier—our nightly trips to the safe rooms demonstrate this reality.

To use a chess analogy: Operation Rising Lion is a gambit. This is a risky maneuver calculated to gain an advantage. The most famous example of this is the Queen’s Gambit, a chess opening where White sacrifices a pawn on the queenside to gain control of the center of the board. The ‘gambit’ refers to sacrificing material that would normally be considered too risky to lose.

In Israel’s case, the obvious risk is massive harm to the home front. This has already been demonstrated by the deaths of 23 civilians in Iranian missile attacks. According to reports, the government has anticipated the deaths of between 800 and 4,000 Israeli civilians during the war (a massive range that reflects the uncertainty involved). This projection has sparked widespread criticism on the left. In Ha’aretz, for example, Rogel Alpher writes: “This is how much the lives of Israelis matter to the government: not at all. The government believes it has the prerogative to have thousands killed every night in a war incapable of achieving any of its goals.”

Responding to this sort of criticism is difficult because it functions primarily as emotional blackmail. Alpher's emotional appeal assumes he holds a monopoly on concern for Israeli lives, but this framing obscures the deeper calculations at stake. The choice isn't between a safe status quo and a risky military gambit—it's between accepting hopefully fewer casualties now versus potentially catastrophic losses later. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, given its ideological commitments, it’s unlikely to simply pocket them as a deterrent. A nuclear-armed Iran would almost certainly reactivate its proxy networks with renewed confidence, knowing that any significant Israeli retaliation risks nuclear escalation. Hamas, Hezbollah, and other Iranian clients would operate under a nuclear umbrella, dramatically constraining Israel's ability to respond to attacks. The government's projection of 800-4,000 casualties, while sobering, must be weighed against the potential for tens of thousands of deaths if Iran achieves nuclear breakout and its proxies resume full-scale operations. Alpher's moral posturing ignores this uncomfortable arithmetic, pretending that we live in a pure world where such dilemmas don’t exist.

It’s also important to emphasize that Israel generally has a good record for protecting the home front. As NonZionism writes:

the energy and resources that Israel expends on minimizing its own civilian casualties is genuinely commendable in a country. This is especially so given that the perverse incentives of international relations are such that Israel would greatly improve its position if it did less of this…I think you have to live here a few years before you understand just how diligent Israel is in this regard.

We shouldn’t overstate this protection. There are still appalling inequalities that fall along predictable ethnic and class lines (note the preponderance of Arabs, Ukrainians, and Sudanese among the victims of Iran’s attacks). But I don’t think Alpher’s claim is accurate.

Equally important is the damage Israel has inflicted on Iran’s missile launchers. According to reports, in the first few days of the war, Israel has destroyed around 120 of Iran’s 360 ballistic missile launchers—a significant number that few would have anticipated beforehand. This achievement gets surprisingly little mention in global coverage.

These two elements, as well as the Mossad’s role in the initial attack, create the impression of a carefully planned operation. This appears to be not something conjured up in a few days to satisfy Netanyahu’s whims, but rather the result of years or decades of preparation. Regular readers of this Substack will know I am no fan of Netanyahu. I eagerly anticipate the day he is no longer the Israeli prime minister. However, I share his view regarding the threat of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons, and I think the early evidence suggests his gambit is worth it. Ehud Barak, an even more sworn enemy of Netanyahu, shares this view. Writing in Ha’aretz, he notes that “Israel's military and intelligence achievement in Iran is exemplary, the result of farsighted planning, precise preparation and decisive execution – everything that was missing on October 7” (although he conspicuously and hilariously praises everyone but Bibi for this).

I hold an old-school view, which I say with no great joy or jingoism: it’s wise to keep your enemies on the defensive. It’s wise to make those actively working towards your destruction fear for their lives. Sitting back and doing nothing while Iran endlessly drags out nuclear negotiations with the United States is also a decision that carries great strategic risks. The world is a dangerous place—it is better to acknowledge this than to falsely pretend that there is always some default peaceful option that will leave us unthreatened.

This doesn’t mean I’m convinced Netanyahu’s gambit will succeed. However weakened the Iranian regime currently is, talk of its imminent demise seems massively exaggerated (though I would love to be wrong). There’s also the mountainous problem of Fordow and the implications of an inconclusive end to the hostilities. Several scenarios could still validate the gambit, though, even with Fordow remaining operational. First, Israel might possess undisclosed capabilities—whether through advanced bunker-busting munitions, cyber warfare, or coordinated strikes—that could neutralize the facility without American assistance. The recent precision strikes suggest Israeli intelligence and operational capacity may be more sophisticated than publicly known. Second, the broader strategic pressure from the campaign could force Iran into genuine negotiations, particularly if the economic and military costs become unsustainable. A significantly weakened Iran might accept intrusive inspections or limitations on enrichment levels at Fordow. Third, even if Fordow remains untouched, the gambit could succeed by dismantling Iran's broader nuclear infrastructure—destroying research facilities, eliminating key personnel, and severing supply chains. The nuclear program is more than just one facility; degrading Iran's overall capability could delay weaponization by years, potentially long enough for regime change or diplomatic breakthroughs to emerge. Finally, American cooperation remains possible, especially if Israel demonstrates that its campaign can achieve what decades of sanctions and diplomacy could not.

Clearly, a failure to address this challenge in a way that massively sets back Iran’s nuclear program would mean the gambit has failed. But I don’t agree that there is no strategy. The strategy is wise: keep those opposed to our existence on the defensive. Turn the tables on those who have tried to surround us with proxies seeking our destruction.

Will the gambit succeed? Time will tell. For now, with all due caution and without any euphoria or triumphalism (believe me there is nothing euphoric or triumphant when thousands of ballistic missiles are pointed at our cities), the early evidence is encouraging, despite the obvious risks.