The Road to Rising Lion

The long genesis of the first Israel-Iran war

The road to Operation Rising Lion began with the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the rise to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who laid out Iran’s opposition to the existence of the State of Israel. Combining Islamic theology, anti-imperialism, and revolutionary ideology, he identified Zionism as a threat to Islamic civilization. This has been articulated as a religious struggle, with Iran’s leaders placing themselves as defenders of Islam against what they argue is a Western colonial project designed to control Muslim lands.

This policy benefited the Iranian regime in several ways. It provided religious legitimacy for the government, connected Iran to the wider Islamic world despite its Shiite minority status, and provided an external enemy that could consolidate domestic support. The Palestinian cause became a central pillar of Iranian foreign policy, with the regime claiming to champion the oppressed against Zionist occupation.

Following the death of Khomeini in 1989, his successor Ali Khameini intensified the anti-Israel rhetoric, repeatedly declaring that Israel should disappear. This position has transcended other divisions within Iranian politics, uniting reformists like Mohammad Khatami with hardliners like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Ebrahim Raisi, representing one of the few areas of broad consensus within the Islamic Republic’s leadership.

This policy has been backed up by practical action. Iran built up what it calls the ‘Axis of Resistance,’ funding and arming proxy groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Occupied Territories, the Houthis in Yemen, and other Shiite militias across the region. This policy is reflected in the quip that Iran is ready to fight Israel “to the last Arab.” Another aim of this policy has been to strengthen Iran’s status in the Arab world despite its Persian Shiite identity.

Despite this ideological hostility, Iran and Israel have rarely directly faced off militarily. Over the years, both countries have engaged in shadow warfare. Israeli operations have clandestinely targeted Iranian nuclear facilities, scientists, and military assets, while Iran has supported attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets around the world. There have also been pragmatic elements to their relationship, most notably during the Iran-Iraq War when Israel provided arms to Iran through the Iran-Contra affair. Yet the basic ideological line of absolute opposition to Israel’s existence has never altered.

None of this was inevitable. Iran was the second Muslim-majority country to recognize Israel (the first was Turkey); under the Shah, the two countries maintained cooperative (albeit largely covert) relations, including intelligence sharing and military cooperation (opposition to the Shah among Iranian revolutionaries contributed to their subsequent hostility towards Israel). Tehran sits roughly 1,500 kilometers from Israel, far enough that this level of hostility requires ideological rather than purely strategic explanations.

The theological dimension, while not deterministic, provides important context. Like Sunni Islam, Shiite theology recognizes Jews as “People of the Book,” acknowledging their divine scripture and monotheistic faith. However, traditional Islamic legal and social structures historically relegated Jews (and Christians) to dhimmi status—protected but subordinate. One distinctive aspect of Shiite theology is the concept of najasa (ritual impurity) applied to non-Muslims, including Jews, which created additional social barriers beyond those found in Sunni contexts.

Jewish experiences under Islamic rule varied enormously across time and place and were often more favorable than under Christian rule in Europe. Many Islamic societies provided refuge for Jews fleeing Christian persecution, most notably the Ottoman empire following the expulsion of the Jews from Spain. However, in Persia following the Safavid conversion to Shiism in the sixteenth century, Jews did face recurring violence, including pogroms and forced conversions, although the intensity of these measures fluctuated significantly.

Today, Iran’s unique combination of revolutionary ideology, geopolitical ambitions, domestic legitimacy needs, and Shiite minority status within the broader Islamic world have activated and intensified latent theological tensions in ways not seen consistently elsewhere. Despite this, the Islamic Republic points to the treatment of its Jewish minority as proof that it maintains a distinction between anti-Zionism and antisemitism. Iran has the largest Jewish population in the Middle East outside of Israel, with Jewish representatives in parliament and active synagogues. However, this ostensible tolerance exists alongside troubling contradictions. Iran’s leaders routinely deny the Holocaust. For example, on International Holocaust Memorial Day in January 2016, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei released a video questioning the Nazi murder of six million Jews. It has also hosted international Holocaust denial conferences. Iranian officials and state media regularly employ classical antisemitic conspiracy theories that go far beyond criticism of Israeli policies,

These contradictions suggest that Iran’s protection of its domestic Jewish community serves strategic rather than principled purposes, providing plausible deniability while supporting antisemitic groups like Hezbollah and Hamas externally. Jews face significant restrictions, particularly on travel to Israel, and must navigate the constant tension between their Jewish identity and loyalty to a regime that regularly promotes antisemitic rhetoric.

This analysis faces criticism. Some argue that Iran’s ideological stance is purely instrumental, designed to enhance regional influence rather than reflecting genuine theological conviction. Others contend that focusing on religious factors minimizes legitimate political grievances about Israelis policies towards the Palestinians. Neither of these, though, explain the depth of the hostility from Iran towards Israel, despite the geographical distance. Put simply, Iran’s hostility towards Israel makes no sense unless understood through the prism of its Shiite ideology. Iran does not hate Israel because of checkpoints in the West Bank or because there is no Palestinian state – it hates Israel because it exists.

The current escalation began following the events of October 7^th, 2023, which triggered a broader regional confrontation that had been building for years through proxy conflicts. In April 2024, following Israel’s strike on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus that killed two Iranian generals, Iran launched Operation True Promise, its first direct attack on Israeli territory, featuring loitering munitions, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. As Matti Friedman wrote: “like a flash going off in a dark room, the attack has finally given the world something valuable: a glimpse of the real war in the Middle East” that had previously been fought by proxies. Following Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, Iran launched Operation True Promise II in October 2024, firing approximately 200 ballistic missiles at Israel.

The regional balance has since shifted dramatically. Hamas and Islamic Jihad have been severely degraded, Bashar al-Assad’s regime has collapsed in Syria, and Hezbollah has been significantly weakened. The Houthis continue launching missiles from Yemen but with limited impact. The ‘Axis of Resistance’ strategy has largely collapsed, leaving Iran more isolated and vulnerable.

This brings us to Iran’s nuclear program, which represents the core strategic challenge. Iran has developed significant nuclear infrastructure. According to recent reports, it possesses enough enriched uranium for several nuclear weapons, though questions remain about weaponization and delivery capabilities.

There have been two primary approaches to this challenge. The diplomatic approach culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, drawn up by the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the European Union, and Iran. The agreement required Iran to reduce its uranium stockpile by 97% and limit enrichment to 3.67%, sufficient for civilian purposes but not weaponization. In exchange, Iran received substantial sanctions relief. However, the agreement contained “sunset clauses” that would have eventually allowed Iran to resume higher levels of nuclear activity.

President Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 was partly motivated by concerns about these sunset clauses, but the withdrawal paradoxically accelerated the timeline by freeing Iran from existing constraints. European countries attempted to maintain the agreement, but Iran gradually reduced its compliance as sanctioned were reimposed.

Recent developments have heightened urgency around the nuclear issue. The UN nuclear watchdog’s Board of Governors recently declared Iran in breach of its non-proliferation obligations for the first time in nearly two decades. Even President Macron, no friend of current Israeli policies, has warned that Iran is approaching a “critical point” in nuclear weapons capability.

For Israel, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran represents an existential threat that cannot be tolerated, given Iran’s explicit calls for Israel’s destruction. This is the backdrop to the launch of Operation Rising Lion (the name refers to Balaam’s biblical blessing of Israel). As Jonathan Spyer explains, Iran’s miscalculations since October 7 created “a moment of extreme vulnerability,” as its proxy network weakened and its direct attacks on Israel provoked devastating responses that severely compromised Iranian air defenses.

Early reports suggest Israel has achieved significant tactical success, assassinating leading military figures and apparently gaining substantial freedom of operation in western Iranian airspace. However, the long-term strategic picture remains unclear. Like the JCPOA’s sunset clause problem, military action faces the challenge that partial success might simply accelerate Iran’s nuclear timeline once hostilities conclude. The underground enrichment facility at Fordow, buried deep in a mountain northeast of Qom, presents a particular challenge that may require American assistance. As Arieh Kovler writes on his Facebook page:

If Israel has some genius plan to take out the Fordow enrichment facility, then this Iran move is a well-calculated strike that makes sense. If Israel’s only plan for dealing with Fordow is “Maybe Trump will do it for us if we ask nicely enough,” then I don’t know what the hell we’re doing. The next week or so will show us if this war sets back the Iranian nuclear programme or if it’s actually going to supercharge it.

Some reports suggest the Iranian regime itself may face internal pressure as military setbacks compound economic difficulties and domestic discontent. However, predictions about regime change have proven notoriously unreliable, and Iranian society’s relationship with its government remain complex, particularly now the country is under attack.

What’s clear, though, is that the current confrontation represents the culmination of tensions that began with Iran’s Islamic revolution and its adoption of eliminationist rhetoric towards Israel. While multiple factors have contributed to this hostility—including the failure to resolve the Palestinian question, regional power competition, and domestic political needs—the theological and ideological frameworks that oppose Jewish sovereignty are the most important element. Whether diplomatic, military, or internal developments can alter this trajectory remains an open question; for now, as Israelis hunker down in bomb shelters and safe rooms, the stakes have never been higher.

I’m hoping to write more over the coming days about the current war, including more personal reflections, the situation on the home front, and more.