The Fall of al-Majdal

The story of the Palestinian town whose residents were forced out after the War of Independence

Amidst the discussions surrounding the death of Yahya Sinwar, some may have noticed that his parents fled the town of Majdal in 1948, ending up in the Khan Younis Refugee Camp. Hamas’s founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was also born nearby, and the families of other leading Hamas figures came from the area. Today, as in ancient times, the main city in the area is Ashkelon; the modern city sits nearby the ancient remains, and partially covers the land of several Palestinian villages that stood in the area, including Majdal. Majdal is unique because some of its inhabitants were forced out towards the end of 1950, that is, over a year after the War of Independence had been concluded. Why did this happen? The answer can be found in Benny Morris’s 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians, specifically the chapter ‘The Transfer of Al Majdal’s Remaining Arabs to Gaza, 1950.’

At the start of 1948, Majdal’s population was around 10,000. During that year, thousands more fled to the village from elsewhere in the country. During Operation Yoav, which began in October, the IDF repeatedly shelled and bombed the town, which had been occupied by the Egyptians, and thousands fled. It was subsequently conquered by the IDF on November 4. OC Southern Front General Yigal Allon ordered the IDF to expel the remaining Palestinians, but the order wasn’t implemented. Interviewed in 1990, Shimon Avidan, the commander of the Givati Brigade, which conquered the town, said he didn’t even remember receiving the order. Instead, he said, a delegation of weavers (the town was known as a weaving center) visited his headquarters and asked to remain. “As the IDF needed uniforms, and as Majdal’s weavers were good craftsmen, I agreed.”

By this stage, the Arab population of Majdal was around 1,000, which increased to around 2,700 over the next two years, primarily due to Palestinians returning from the Gaza Strip, from elsewhere in the south, or from natural growth. This was like what happened in other urban centers, for example Lod/Ramle, Jaffa, Haifa, and Akko, most of whose residents became refugees during the war, but whose Arab population subsequently increased moderately due to people moving from elsewhere. What placed Majdal’s population in a more perilous position, though, was its strategic location close to the Gaza Strip.

Jewish immigrants began moving into Majdal in 1949, settling in the abandoned Arab houses. Allon demanded that Arabs be removed from the town, as the IDF did not want an Arab town near the Egyptian border. At the start of 1950, the IDF formally requested government permission to evict them. As Israel was then seeking admission to the UN, the request was delayed.

The Committee for Transferring Arabs had been established at the end of 1948. Today, the word “transfer” evokes plans by the Israeli far-right to expel Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, but this committee was actually responsible for resettling internally displaced Arabs inside Israel. In 1949-50 they resettled Galilee Arabs in places like ‘Akbara, Mazara’a, Tur’an, and Reineh. In early 1950, the government approved the transfer of Majdal’s remaining Arabs to other towns in Israel (mainly Ramle and Jaffa). According to the minutes of the meeting: “It was decided that this would be carried out without coercion. It was also decided that land would be bought from owners desiring to leave the country.”

Like other Arab population centers in the country, Majdal was placed under military rule (this ended in 1966). In the early spring of 1950, the military governor told Majdal’s Arabs that they had to leave. Around 200 people, who had come from the village of Qatra during the war, moved to Ramle, where ironically, they were resettled in abandoned Palestinian homes. Not long after, though, General Moshe Dayan, the new IDF OC Southern Command, who supported the removal of all Israel’s Arab minority out of the country, decided they should move to the Gaza Strip. On June 19, he received authorization from Ben-Gurion. In his memoirs, Dayan notes that the Prime Minister added a condition “that we would make the transfer only if the Majdal Arabs themselves agreed to it.”

In practice, though, the transfer to Gaza had already begun five days earlier, on June 14. Dayan later recalled: “After talking to them [the Majdal Arabs], I found that the majority wished to move inside the Gaza Strip…while some wanted to go to other towns inside Israel. I thought this an admirable solution.” He also said that the Egyptians agreed.

Resistance was offered by the Histadrut. In April 1949, its Economic Department and its Bureau for Co-operation with Arab Workers proposed that Majdal’s Arabs establish a weaving cooperative, with 200 workers and 100 looms, as well as an agricultural cooperative. By March 1950, they had mobilized around 110 families.

The Histadrut sought government agreement that members of the cooperative would not be transferred. Uri Chechik, the officer in charge, told the Histadrut representative E.N. Mul “clearly and emphatically” that the army wouldn’t expel anyone who wanted to stay. In August 1950, Mul met Ben-Gurion’s adviser on Arab affairs, Yehoshua Palmon, who agreed to lease land outside Majdal for the cooperative and stated that the government’s policy was that the cooperative members would not be transferred.

In practice, though, the transfer continued. Local Arab dignitaries helped register the transferees, the sale of their property, and their transportation to Gaza. None of them were able to sell their houses or land, which, like that of refugees from the war, was given to the Custodian of Absentees Properties. Most were made to sign a form declaring that their departure was voluntary and renouncing their right of return. In August, Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: “The Arabs are fleeing Migdal-Gad. 1,500 are left. They are going to Gaza and Hebron. The Egyptians are receiving them. They are being allowed to sell their possessions and to exchange money.”

Later, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official said: “It is not right [to say that] the Arabs of Majdal were expelled…No Arabs were ejected from Majdal by force.” Morris says in response: “these contemporary qualified denials of deliberate Israeli flight-inducing measures are misleading and disingenuous.” According to him, the main cause for their exodus was systematic intimidation by the authorities, although the earlier departure to Ramle of the 200 Arabs from Qatra also played a role: “Certainly, the registration for departure to Gaza by one family affected and ate away at the staying power of their neighbors, relatives, and friends. Few wanted to be ‘left behind’ or ‘left alone’ to face the Israelis and life under Israeli rule.” They also suffered from poverty and unemployment, which had been partly engineered by Israel.

Other forms of economic pressure included being charged for drinkable water, ration delays, and being forbidden from selling the produce from orange groves. On the other hand, they were able to exchange Israeli pounds with British Mandate Palestine pounds, which were still in use in Gaza. The exchange rate was favourable towards the Arabs, allowing them to purchase property and deal in commerce in Gaza (and they also received support from the UN). In addition, they sold possessions at high prices. Another “pull” factor was the burgeoning weaving industry in Gaza, under Quaker tutelage. Many Majdal weavers, who were able to take their looms with them, thought they would find employment there.

What about the efforts of the Histadrut? Throughout 1950, military officials told the cooperative members they would have to leave. By the end of September, only 34 Arab families were still signed on to the cooperative. Chechik called in the Arab family heads and told them they “should place no hope in the Executive Committee [of the Histadrut] that it would save them” and that “the army…would suddenly…throw them out and deposit them somewhere in the Galilee without a roof over their heads and without food.”

This policy intensified in September, when the military government stopped supplying residents with food rations. Soldiers “knocked their rifle butts against the doors of Arab houses and shouted: “Get out of here, infiltrators! Yallah, go to Gaza!” They also used to fire at night into the air. On 8 October they confiscated food from the houses of the remaining Arabs. The next day Hassan Hijazi, the secretary of the weavers’ cooperative, was summoned to the military government headquarters and told to stop dealing with the cooperative’s affairs and to stop telling members they would be allowed to remain in the country. “No Arab will remain,” he was told, although he himself moved to Lod.

These efforts included deceiving the press. On 8 October the local Arab schoolmaster was told to close his school. The next day, though, some journalists visited, so he was ordered to reopen it, only to be ordered to close it for good the next day. In response, on October 10, Mul and two other Histadrut members travelled to Majdal, where they were initially refused entry by the IDF. They then gathered the families from the cooperative and said that those who wanted would be able to stay. Sixteen families took this option, but Dayan told Mul that the Histadrut “was pulling in a direction contrary to his own operations; he, the general, was trying to liquidate the Arab area in Migdal.”

Histadrut Secretary-General Pinhas Lavon now went directly to Ben-Gurion, and on 11 October Dayan was ordered to suspend the operation. The three men met two days later, and Ben-Gurion agreed that those who wished to stay in Israel could move to Ramle, Nazareth, or Haifa. By the end, only 20 were left in Majdal, 17 of whom were part of the cooperative. Reports stated that they were “depressed, hungry and completely shattered.” Most soon moved to Lod, the rest to Gaza. Dayan and others celebrated the end of the operation at the Kassit coffee shop; in 1956, the city officially became Ashkelon once more.  

Dayan subsequently whitewashed these events:

I think that the evacuation of Majdal’s Arabs is a natural phenomenon of a pointless situation on the one hand and convenient conditions…for emigration on the other. The mass impetus to go which took hold of the whole community also contributed to this. It is worth noting that the emigrants are not depressed and that their relations with the authorities and the many preparations for the transfer are characterized by a light-hearted spirit and, almost, conviviality. The Arabs understand that in the absence of a permanent peace there is no point to the present situation and they do not blame the local authorities in Majdal.

Morris rejects these explanations:

Most if not all the ministers probably perceived the transfer as an important Israeli interest, in terms of demography (less Arabs), day-to-day security (less infiltration back and forth across the Gaza border), strategy (no Arab population concentration to serve as a way station for invading Egyptians), and immigration absorption and town-planning (more space for Jewish settlers and one less problem in building or rebuilding Ashkelon).

This, in turn, helps us understand why these events weren’t replicated after the war in places like Ramle, Haifa, or Akko, where, because these cities weren’t located close to the border, the day-to-day security and strategic worries weren’t as pronounced. Despite the demographic concerns, most Arabs who remained within the borders of the State of Israel at the end of the war weren’t subsequently transferred or expelled, and became citizens of the country. Ultimately, Majdal was a victim of geography.