Jethro's Skull
What a Druze holy site tells us about the group’s relationship with the state
This is the second of a two-part series. For the first part see here.
Nabi Shu’ayb, close to Tiberias, is today the most important Druze site (maqam) in Israel. Known as Jethro’s Tomb in English, it reputably houses the resting place of the Druze prophet Shu’ayb, who has been identified with the biblical Jethro, Moses’ father-in-law. In Islam, Shu’ayb is one of the four Arabian prophets sent by God (the others are Hud, Saleh, and Muhammad). In the Druze tradition, Shuayb died in a nearby cave after taking refuge there, with his followers burying him at the site.
In 1047, the Persian traveller Nasir Khusraw described the shrine for the first time. It’s located next to Hittin, where Saladin defeated the Crusaders in 1187; one Druze tradition says that the night before the battle he dreamed that an angel promised him victory if afterwards he rode his horse westward until it stopped at the location of Shu’ayb’s burial site.
The Druze only received full control of Nabi Shu’ayb after 1948, when the Hittin villagers were expelled during Operation Dekel. In August 1949, an Israeli Ministry of Religions document argued:
This site [Nabi Shu’ayb] is the most sacred to all Druzes much like the sanctuary of Mecca for the Muslims. This gives Israel an extraordinary tool by which to prove, both religiously and politically, its attitude towards the Druze community, which makes it a primary instrument for propaganda to prepare the ground for potential developments in the near future among the Druzes.
The claim that it was like Mecca for Muslims wasn’t true. During the Mandate period, the traditional ziyara to the site had taken place from 20 to 27 April, and some Sunni Muslims also participated. As Kais M. Firro notes, though, it was not an official feast, nor did it attract pilgrims from outside the Galilee. Israel now sought to amplify the pilgrimage as a major Druze celebration. April 26 became the new date for the ziyara, with invitations issued by the Minorities Unit (by now more commonly known as the Druze Unit). In 1950 the date changed again, to 25 April, while in 1954 it was recognized as an official three-day holiday (this was later extended to four days); concurrently, Eid al-Fitr was no longer recognized as a Druze feast. Ben-Gurion sought to follow the principles of the Ottoman millet system and to give the Druze the status of an independent religious community. Meanwhile, Nabi Shu’ayb became the site for the swearing-in ceremony of Druze soldiers.
It was during this time that the idea of a special Druze-Jewish relationship dating back to the marriage of Moses and Zipporah began to develop. In 1956, the Druze were compelled to serve in the military for the first time. Today many think this decision was welcomed by the entire Druze community, but in reality the decision was fiercely contested. For example, the Druze spiritual leader Shaykh Amin Tarif was opposed to Druze conscription due to fears about how it would impact the status of Druze in other countries and worries over being accused of treason. That year, only about one quarter of Druze conscripts reported for duty, with many being arrested. Like the Haredim today, many Druze argued that the army didn’t need their service.
Throughout this period, Israel’s policy was driven by the goal of preventing minorities from coalescing into a group that would be “Arab in its national identity and Muslim in its religion…Since Israel could not impose cultural assimilation, the best way to deal with the minorities was ‘to divide and sub-divide them’” (according to Minister of Minorities Affairs Bechor-Shalom Shitrit). In 1957 the Druze were granted “an independent legal recognition” by the Minister of Religious Affairs. Also that year, the “nationality: Arab” clause in Druze ID cards was replaced by “nationality: Druze” (today this clause no longer appears on ID cards). In 1961-62, the state established a spiritual head and religious courts for the community. Finally, in 1974 two committees recommended the separation of Druze education from other Arab communities in Israel to “educate and inculcate the Druze youth with Israeli-Druze consciousness” as a means of “serving the continuation of the community’s particularist existence.” These steps gradually defeated the anti-conscription movement.
Israel has been criticized for its “divide-and-rule” approach, even though in many respects this reflected a continuation of the earlier Millet system, one which is often depicted (sometimes by the same critics) as a great model of pluralism and tolerance. Given the fact that Israel had just won a war against Arab nationalism, it would have been strange had it subsequently tried to strengthen these elements among its own citizens. However, we have now reached a stage where Druze loyalty is taken for granted. The awful Nation-State Law seems to be the straw that has broken the camel’s back, along with a whole host of other legitimate grievances. We cannot expect the state’s Jewishness to be accepted by the Druze and others if it doesn’t fulfil its civic side of the bargain, no matter what the state does with ancient shrines.