The Israel-Lebanese border is weird, even by the standards of a world full of weird borders. Known as the Blue Line, it heads east from the Mediterranean at Rosh HaNikra, twisting and turning until it reaches Malkia, from where it suddenly heads north to Metula, wrapping itself around the top of the Galilee Panhandle before it reaches the Syrian border. Unlike many borders, it contains no natural boundaries to distinguish between the two countries it divides. The most obvious natural boundary, the Litani River, lies nearly 30km to the north. Why, then, did this not form the border between Israel and Lebanon?
The border was originally determined between French Syria and British Palestine in the Paulet-Newcombe Agreement of 1923, following the Sykes-Picot Agreement and various other negotiations. Following their conquest of Palestine, the British wanted the Litani to form the northern border, and for it to stretch across to the Banias springs on the slopes of Mount Hermon. As David Eshel writes in his article ‘The Israel-Lebanon Border Enigma’: “It is unfortunate, in view of subsequent events, that this viewpoint with its far-reaching strategic implications was a casualty of lengthy political haggling and was ignored.”
The border was never fully delineated, and at first made little difference to the lives of those living on either side, who continued to cross freely. The majority-Shi’ite south of Lebanon remained neglected and more closely integrated with northern Palestine. Eshel writes: “The result was twofold: on the one hand, the traditionally good neighborly relations between Jews, Christians and Shi’ite Muslims remained close, but on the other, the lack of governmental control produced a haven for irresponsible elements, such as smugglers and armed Arab bands infiltrating into Palestine.”
This situation intensified when the Arab Revolt broke out in 1936. South Lebanon now became an area for recruitment and cross-border raids. In 1937 Sir Charles Tegart, previously a member of the Secretary of State’s Indian Council, was sent to Palestine to suppress the revolt; in his first report he noted that the border could not be effectively defended because of the topographical conditions. To improve this situation, a frontier road and concrete blockhouses were built.
During the War of Independence, the Lebanese army attacked and captured two small Israeli villages along the border; in May 1948 Palmach commandos destroyed a bridge over the Litani, while Ben-Gurion spoke of conquering the area up to the river. In October 1948, during Operation Hiram, Israel took control of the border region and subsequently remained in southern Lebanon until the armistice agreement in March 1949. During this period, some of the Christian and Shi’ite village heads asked for protection from Israeli forces against Sunni Muslim marauders; this request was rejected. “Years later Israelis were to look back on those missed opportunities with great longing, but by then it was too late, the border had turned into a battlefield,” Eshel writes.
Following the armistice agreement, controversy remained over the Har Dov/Shebaa Farms area, although there were other complex issues, for example the Alawite village of Ghajar. Despite its weirdness, though, the Blue Line has proved surprisingly durable. Israel occupied southern Lebanon following the First Lebanon War; one month after its withdrawal in May 2000, the UN Security Council endorsed UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s assertion that Israel had “withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with Resolution 425.”
For some Israelis, though, the Litani remains the holy grail. Avigdor Lieberman, for example, recently said that “everything between the Litani and Israel must be under the control of the IDF.” Meanwhile, a new group called Uri Tzafon (named after a biblical verse that means ‘Awaken, O North’) has demanded Israeli civilian settlements in south Lebanon. Eliyahu Ben Asher, one of the founding members, says: “what is called ‘southern Lebanon’…is really and truly simply the northern Galilee.” While geographically speaking he is correct, the chances of the group realizing their dreams are slim, although as Akiva Eldar notes, “they [the settler movement] planted seeds, which grew into trees, which grew into a jungle.”
It is ironic, though, that an awkwardly assembled colonial border has come to be seen as unmovable, particularly as it has undoubtedly helped Hezbollah continue its war against Israel. If one were to start from scratch, the Blue Line would not have been delineated in the way it has. Still, though, whatever the outcome of the ongoing war in the north, the smart money is on it remaining in place.
Thanks for another fascinating piece.
Can I get a source for the claim that " some of the Christian and Shi’ite village heads asked for protection from Israeli forces against Sunni Muslim marauders; this request was rejected"?
I see the story of Christian villages floated in lots of places, but it always is anecdotal. Are there records of this?