How do Hamas View the War?

An exclusive look at a book written by one of the organization's senior commanders

Today on Love of the Land, something a little bit different. This week on X, I read a summary by Lian Marai of a recent book written by Ahmed Abu Suhayb, apparently a senior commander in Hamas’s missile force in Gaza. With permission, I present here a translation of the summary, along with Lian’s introduction. This is an important text that should be widely read, because it provides a glimpse into Hamas’s strategic thinking, one that receives surprisingly little attention in media coverage of the war (especially outside Israel). Next week, I’ll share some of my reactions to the text.

Lian’s Introduction

“If there’s one regret about the flood – it’s that we took 251 prisoners instead of 3,000.”

I read it. Page after page. To tell the truth, I read the book twice.

The Al-Aqsa Flood – Contexts and Results is a book that was published in Gaza, written by Ahmed Abu Suhayb, apparently a senior commander in Hamas’s missile force.

He tries to explain: Why did Hamas carry out the October 7 massacre? Was there really a strategy behind it? When did the plans start coming together? What were they trying to achieve and where, without meaning to, did their plans collapse into a strategic failure?

I read the book to try to understand how they view the massacre. Not how we interpret it – but how they justify it to themselves and to the Palestinian street.

So what was really going through their heads? Here is a summary of seven points from the book that have created a major buzz on Palestinian social media.

Without commentary. Without additions. This is how they think. This is how they explain it to themselves. Each point is written exactly as it is expressed in the book. Without editing, without revisions. Without filtering.

1. Was Al-Aqsa Flood the wrong decision?

This question does not stem from an objective reading but is imbued with the flavor of the bloody savagery that ignited the people of Gaza in its flames. Many of those dealing with this question are themselves targets of the Zionist plan of “consciousness distortion.”

Hence, to respond to this question, the first thing to do is to remember the root of the problem and the substance of the conflict, and to look at the decision [to launch] Al-Aqsa Flood as part of the historical struggle. Only in this way can we understand it properly and evaluate it, and identify what was right and what was wrong.

Are the Palestinians different from [other] nations who fell under occupation? Every nation that struggled against occupation paid a heavy price for its freedom. This price is actually paid by the weak nations who face the occupier more than by the occupation forces themselves.

And the side that wins is always the most patient: When the occupier understands that it can’t bear the cost – it leaves. But this only happens after mass slaughter.

No nation has freed itself from occupation after suffering fewer victims than the occupier. And for the most part, freedom doesn’t happen in a single generation but takes several generations. Each generation passes the mission of freedom to the next generation. If they succeed, this is good, and they leave a free country to their grandchildren. If not, then the following generation continues the struggle anew.

Hence, the obligation of struggle isn’t a decision by a certain group within the nation under occupation, but is an obligation of everyone. Those who avoid it are cowards or traitors - not wise, and not neutral.

2. Looking how things developed before Al-Aqsa Flood we clearly see that the Zionists were afraid of three arenas – Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza. Their previous military manoeuvres simulated a simultaneous war on three fronts.

Until they were ready, politically and militarily, to start this major war, they dealt with Gaza using the “pain relief” method: treating the symptoms, the headaches. The main element of this approach was the constant multiplying of security measures on land, at sea, and in the air.

The land barrier was gradually built up with layers of security and underground sensors, until they were able to prevent two major operations via attack tunnels designed to capture hostages. All the operatives were killed. The tunnels method failed.

Also at sea the Zionists increased the security complexity. In the air, they enhanced the Iron Dome so that the resistance could only fire 100 rockets one time for a few of them to get through. This was a huge drain on the resistance’s capabilities.

This, combined with strengthening of the siege – which the Egyptian regime participated in enthusiastically – and the blows that the enemy occasionally inflicted, prevented the resistance from gathering strength and testing their capabilities.

Behind all this was a massive intelligence war. The enemy succeeded in exposing many important things – thanks to its technological supremacy and its powerful spying capabilities – regarding the resistance’s plans and means. Every small success in this field was enough to wipe out years of work, huge funds, and painstaking efforts.

Meanwhile, the resistance in Gaza tried repeatedly to use political and military means to escape the siege, as well as isolation from the main issues: Jerusalem, the prisoners, and the land. It showed political flexibility and military genius, but all this failed in the end due to the Arab reality that tried to eliminate it.

Therefore, since 2014, the decision was made: not to enter a long war against the occupation, unless it could achieve a substantive goal regarding a tangible issue like Jerusalem or the prisoners so there wouldn’t be yet another exhausting round with nothing to show for it.

3. The idea of Al-Aqsa Flood emerged accidentally during the marches of return, when several breaches in the land fence were revealed. It was necessary to work quickly and secretly to exploit these opportunities, because if the enemy had noticed the breaches, or if information had leaked to them, then the opportunity would be lost.

The resistance’s assessment was: to carry out an extensive attack on enemy positions close to the Strip, based on the understanding that it would fail in most cases. However, the shock it would produce, and the few captives that would be taken, would lead to a severe response from the enemy, but one that we would ultimately be able to manage. In this way, the resistance would be able to achieve a tangible result on issues like Jerusalem or the prisoners.

But the resistance’s assessment proved wrong – because the attack was successful beyond all expectations, and the massive Zionist backlash was also completely unexpected.

The “flood” was one of the most impressive military operations in history – just as the Zionist war in Gaza became one of the most brutal and immoral wars in recent memory.

4. Of the many questions raised, three are most important:

1. Would it have been better to have postponed the attack until we were stronger?

2. Would it have been better for the attack to have been smaller and more limited, to avoid provoking the immense cruelty from the enemy?

3. Did the attack provide an excuse for the occupation’s barbarism?

If we had postponed the attack, what would have happened? Ultimately, the land wouldn’t have been freed through small battles and attrition operations. If we hadn’t attacked that day, we would have attacked later, when we would have been weaker, and the enemy would have been stronger because time and the accumulation of power worked in their favor.

We were living under siege, whose pressure was increasing, while our enemy had abundant resources – money, weapons, and technology. Not a single day passed when the scales weren’t tipping more in their direction. The day wasn’t far off when they would develop a weapon and Iron Dome system at a level that would render all our weapons and missiles useless.

There was no certainty that our plans wouldn’t one day be exposed, or that the enemy wouldn’t gain a new technological advantage that would expose the tunnels, the missile storage sites, and commanders’ locations. Then a crushing blow would have fallen upon us, or we would have been powerless against a new maneuver – political or military. Even the flood itself was supposed to fail completely, if there had been – deliberately or otherwise – a security upgrade to the separation fence.

Furthermore, waiting would have led to the death of the [Palestinian] issue itself, because it had suffered damaging blows in the wave of normalization of Gulf states with Israel, followed by major campaigns whose goal was to diminish the Palestinian issue and transform it into solely an internal problem. Added to this were repeated threats to Al Aqsa and the repeated intrusions it faced, as well as the weakening resistance in the West Bank and within Israel.

What if we had considered reducing the attack? What happened in practice surprised the resistance no less than it surprised the enemy. We didn’t expect it to be successful, nor that we would take so many captives.

But if we go back in time and decide to reduce the attack – what would we have gotten in return? Another small battle like the previous rounds, which empty Gaza and require years to rehabilitate what’s lost, only to return to exactly the same situation. This assumes the enemy’s response would be proportional, but this enemy lacks all morality. Their crimes are accepted with understanding by countries around the world, they enjoy regional support, they do not limit their response in any way.

If the attack had been smaller, we would have lost. The number of hostages in our hands would have been far fewer than what actually happened. In other words, a smaller attack would have only reduced the cards in our hands, without guaranteeing that the enemy’s response would be less severe

If there is something to regret, it’s that the attack wasn’t bigger, that we only took 250 – 300 hostages. If only we had taken 2,500 – 3,000 hostages! But nobody expected the enemy to be so fragile.

Experience with the Zionists shows this is an enemy that doesn’t hesitate to be barbaric – because nobody restrains them! This was particularly relevant since the resistance’s intelligence had identified the enemy’s plans for a sudden, large-scale attack aimed at harming the senior leadership and strategy. Plans for a ground invasion of Gaza were also ready – they were waiting for final improvements before getting the green light. Similar plans also existed for invading southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights. All of this would have happened – they were just waiting for the right moment.

The enemy wasn’t avoiding hostilities on these fronts, but simply postponed them. The flood surprised him, and seized the initiative from him, together with many captives.

However, the barbarism we see now would have happened anyway, even without the flood. Why? Because the enemy sees this barbarism as a military necessity to shock the resistance and undermine its control. Therefore, they implement it even without military necessity.

One of the enemy’s targets is: expelling the population and expanding their territory, which won’t happen without the tremendous shock of barbarism. This was the enemy’s plan even before the flood – and it will remain [their plan] afterwards. Whether the flood had happened or not.

5. If there was any defect by the resistance, it’s that we didn’t correctly assess the Zionist backlash.

It was based on this evaluation that we drew up the defensive plans and plans for managing the internal situation.

But who can blame the resistance for the attack succeeding far beyond expectations?

Moreover, an attempt to second-guess decisions after the fact ignores many factors and details that were taken into account as part of the secret plans that accompanied the flood. Because only the resistance itself can evaluate what the best alternatives were in this situation.

The question may arise: Who’s responsible for what happened?

The answer is: We don’t ask someone who fulfilled their duty, “Why did you fulfil your duty?”

But we ask someone who didn’t fulfil their duty: “Why didn’t you?”

If Gaza did its maximum and even performed a miracle – the question needs to be directed at those who didn’t fulfil their duty: in the territories of occupied Palestine, in the Arab world, in the Islamic world, and the world at large!

If all these had done their duty – as Gaza did – then the enemy wouldn’t have succeeded in carrying out their appalling massacre!

There are those who relate to the Palestinian issue with the principle: “May Palestine be liberated” rather than “We want to free Palestine.”

After all, desire produces intense action and even instils spirit and consciousness in a person – through which they understand that the price that must be paid to free Palestine will be no less than the price other occupied peoples paid.

It may be an even bigger price – because of the uniqueness and sanctity of this issue. What has been paid so far is only part of the price, and we don’t know if the bigger part has been paid yet.

6. Did we win?

Revolutions and liberation movements don’t win with a single decisive blow, but through cumulative, continuous, patient, and constant steps.

Victory will be achieved by those who are more patient, those who can get up again after every blow, those with more hope and a stronger grip!

Therefore, the power calculation of the occupier is different from the calculation of the occupied: for those living under occupation, it’s enough not to be broken or defeated. But for the occupying power – if it doesn’t win, then it loses. And if it doesn’t achieve its goals – then it fails.

It may be that each round will end without the nation being victorious, but it will end only when the occupation withdraws. The same occupation which may have won each small round will lose in end.

We have evidence for this nearby – the Syrian Revolution: In each round, it lost. But in the end it won, after many painful blows. When victory comes, all the victims become a source of pride!

They may say: We may not have won this round, but in any case, we will decide whether we’ve lost or not, because defeat is a decision made by each person.

7. The strategic failure of the enemy was their attempt to remove all the threats. To eradicate all three fronts threatening them: Iran, Lebanon, and Gaza.

But all three are still standing. Even Gaza, the weakest of them all, which absorbed most of the firepower – the resistance continues to control the territory and manage the campaign from within.

Israel failed in all its attempts to uproot Gaza’s residents – especially the residents of the north, whose endurance has become legendary. It even failed to impose an alternative civil government on them.

No entity exists that can control Gaza without agreement or coordination with the resistance. And Israel still has no security from the threat of Gaza.

Israel succeeded in weakening the threat but has not removed it.

The big surprise: the unexpected achievement of the Syrian Revolution. A revolution that will in the future nurture a new, dangerous and threatening front against the Zionist entity.