Counting the Dead
Why Hamas refuses to declare its war casualties
Earlier this morning, Hamas announced that 40 people were killed in an Israeli attack in the al-Mawasi humanitarian zone in the southern Gaza Strip. In response, the IDF said that its jets had struck “significant Hamas terrorists” who had “advanced and deployed terror plots against IDF troops and Israeli civilians.” It added: “Before the attack, many steps were taken to reduce the chance of harming civilians, including the use of precision weaponry, aerial surveillance and additional intelligence information.” Hamas denied Israel’s claims, saying: “This is a clear lie that aims to justify these ugly crimes. The resistance has denied several times that any of its members exist within civilian gatherings or using these places for military purposes.” The casualty figures were announced by a Gaza civil defense official, not the Ministry of Health, which is responsible for the official tally. Whatever the final count, we can be certain of one thing: Hamas will not admit if any of those killed were among its fighters.
Hamas secured its greatest propaganda victory in its war against Israel when it took the simple but effective decision not to publicize the deaths of its combatants. Thus, the international media reports the casualty rate as follows: “The number of Palestinians killed is 41,664, according to the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health.” The psychological impression created by this omission is that every single dead Palestinian is a civilian. Given how widespread – and unchallenged – this reporting of casualty figures remains, it’s no surprise that the genocide libel has spread so widely.
Now, in an important report in Ha’aretz by Sheren Falah Saab, ‘Why Hamas Tries to Hide the Number of Its Militants Killed by Israel,’ we can examine this strategy in greater depth. As a Gazan called Adnan (a pseudonym, like all the other names in the article) says: “The common assumption is that if they publish the names of dead militants, the world will identify less with Gazans.” Another interviewee, Nadia, explains further: “When you don’t talk about armed men, don’t mention them, don’t mention their being killed – they don’t exist in the dialogue.”
How, then, do Gazans share news of people who are killed in combat? According to Assam, they use a code, “advancing not retreating,” which is taken from the Hadith: “A man asks the messenger of God: ‘Do you think that if I am killed for Allah, my sins will be forgiven?’ The messenger answers: ‘Yes. If you are killed for Allah, as long as you are patient and content, advancing and not retreating.” A Hamas member killed fighting Israel, then, is “advancing not retreating.”
There are some exceptions to this policy, however. The deaths of senior officials or those with important jobs in civilian affairs are publicised, for example the Deputy Director of Gaza Civil Emergency Service, Mohammad Morsi, who was killed along with four family members in airstrikes earlier this week. Nadia explains: “They release only the names of activists who aren’t directly involved in the fighting and whose activities focus on humanitarian matters.” In the West Bank, meanwhile, the Hamas Telgram channel has announced all members killed since October 7, complete with names and pictures.
While there is some debate over the war’s overall casualty rate, the number of 41,664 feels reasonable, and the daily tallies released by the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health generally seem to reflect the shifting intensity of the fighting. Even if we accept a low estimate of 10,000 Hamas fighters killed, though, the psychological impact of publishing this number would be significant. Instead of “41,664 have been killed in Gaza,” the statement would read “41,664 have been killed in Gaza – 10,000 Hamas fighters/militants/terrorists and 31,664 civilians [or vice versa].” In other words, it would be clear that what is taking place is a harsh war in an urban environment, and not a genocide.
Hamas’s strategy goes back over a decade. During the 2014 war, for example, Hamas declared: “The Ministry of the Interior and National Security [in the Gaza Strip] calls on all our [Palestinian] people and the resistance factions to be wary of disseminating information and pictures of fatalities of the resistance, and [about] mentioning details about [the circumstances of] their deaths as martyrs and where they died.” They also announced: “Anyone killed or martyred is to be called a civilian from the Gaza Strip or Palestine, before we talk about his status in jihad or his military rank. Don’t forget to always add “innocent civilian” or innocent citizen in your description of those killed in Israeli attacks on the Gaza Strip.”
Few seem particularly interested in how many Hamas fighters have died, though. One exception to this is The Atlantic’s Graeme Wood, who in May (‘The UN’s Gaza Statistics Make No Sense’) wrote about OCHA’s sudden revision of the numbers of Palestinian women and children killed during the war, as well as Israel’s decision (which he criticized) not to let international journalists into Gaza. The fundamental point is that – whatever the protestations of so-called ‘credible aid organizations,’ who themselves are often untrustworthy – Hamas’s figures cannot be trusted, because they refuse to acknowledge their own dead fighters.
Even if one accepts a higher estimate for the number of Hamas fighters killed, though, the toll on the civilian population has been horrendous. And while the primary blame for this lies with Hamas for launching its murderous war on October 7, Israel, despite claims to the contrary, has not always done everything it could to avoid civilian suffering. I struggle to see how a casual observer could deny this, even if acknowledging the obvious distortions and Hamas propaganda efforts.
Critiques of the war from this direction, though, are still fairly rare. Back in December, for example, Jack Omer-Jackaman wrote an excellent piece in Persuasion that’s worth quoting at length:
How much injustice can a war contain before it is no longer a just war? History is certainly replete with wars we consider just on the whole, but which were littered with gross violations of human rights and decency. What was true on October 7th is true today: Hamas is a mass-raping, civilian-slaughtering, baby-kidnapping evil, whose defeat should be supported by all friends of Israel and all friends of Palestine. But I cannot be silent when my own reason and my own heart conclude that Gazan civilians are not being sufficiently protected. In the failure of Israeli strikes to distinguish between civilian and terrorist, and in the hampering of humanitarian aid efforts, too much of this war is being fought unjustly.
My own brand of Zionism is often accused of “shooting and crying” – of advocating Israeli self-defense and then shedding crocodile tears at the subsequent loss of Palestinian life. I have never quite understood the insult here. In Israel’s tough neighborhood shooting is, and will likely always be, required to some extent. To cry over it seems to me to recognize the tragedy in this reality, to advocate Israeli responses that cause the least unintended Palestinian suffering possible, and to continue to work towards a day when gunfire might ring a little less often.
Far more common are those who argue that any kind of military force against Hamas is at best an act of revenge and at worst an act of genocide. These arguments are strengthened immeasurably by Hamas’s strategy of pretending that not even one of those killed are combatants.
The international media should have refused to publish the Hamas casualty figures unless they clearly distinguished between civilians and combatants. Presented with what is an obvious falsification of reality, they should have refused to publish any Hamas-issued casualty figures unless the Ministry of Health in Gaza adhered to standard practice in wartime and listed which of the dead were combatants. The fact that there is so little interest in what is obviously an abnormal situation reflects the wider context of reporting on the war, its causes and implications. At least now we understand why.
Excellent piece of analysis, Alex
Unless one is privy to the information underlying every IDF targeting decision, the only way in which compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict may be measured, comments based on the resulting death and devastation are, by definition, uninformed and unhelpful.
The obvious problem faced by the IDF is that revealing that targeting information - which seems rather detailed as the names of the targets are often identified - may expose sensitive intelligence gathering capabilities which, if revealed, will result in countermeasures by a future adversary - a category hardly limited to Hamas.
What should be getting far more media exposure than it has is South Africa’s request for additional months to compile evidence to support its “genocide” case before the International Court of Justice. This case was brought on an emergency basis with South Africa claiming that a “genocide” was so obviously occurring in real time that ICJ intervention was mandated.
As we know, even the ICJ refused to fall for this propaganda ploy, especially given how taking any of the requested action would irreparably damage its reputation for impartiality should it turn out that the facts never supported the claim. And it’s not as if the ICJ’s integrity in matters relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict was previously unimpeachable . One need only consider its earlier uninformed advisory opinions on the “Separation Wall” and subsequently its historically and legally illiterate finding on “occupation” to see an ongoing bias.
The only difference I can see is that these two advisory opinions are one-offs, limited to Israel and hence of no other real world application (will the rationale of the “occupation” decision be used to liberate Northern Cyprus from Turkish control, Tibet from China’s or the Kuril Islands from Russia’s, to take only the most obvious examples? I won’t hold my breath).
A ruling finding Israel guilty of “genocide” on the facts would effectively devalue this important human rights concept and drain it of its special meaning. If Gaza is a genocide, then pretty much any military intervention can be one. Worse, it will validate Hamas’ strategy of embedding your forces among a civilian population and sacrificing them for military and political advantage. Not even the ICJ is prepared to take that fateful step.
What South Africa’s request for additional time reveals is the moral and legal bankruptcy of the “genocide” claim. It quite obviously brought this case in bad faith and for ulterior motives. South Africa is worthy of sanction for its duplicity and abuse of the legal system - but that will never happen as we know.
The ICJ, however, has been presented with a golden opportunity to extricate itself from embarrassment by denying this request and dismissing the case. Will it?
Whatever course it follows, the “protesters” will continue to peddle the genocide libel and the press will repeat it for the simple reason that what is now deemed newsworthy is not the truth of the claim asserted but that such a claim is being made regardless of the clear lack of supporting evidence.